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The Public Interest in Union Democracy
By Clyde W. Summers*
If there be any public policy touching the government
of labor unions, and there can be no doubt that there is,
it is that traditionally democratic means of improving
their union may be freely availed of by members without
fear of harm or penalty. 1
F OR two years during a period of relative labor peace, the spot-
light has been focused on labor unions more sharply than at
any time since the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. Attention
has been centered not on union-management relations but on the
internal operations of unions. Primary attention has been on the
diversion of union funds, and the use by union leaders of their
positions of power for self-enrichment. Secondary but substantial
attention has been on union governmental processes through which
union leaders are chosen and union policies made. During the last
session of Congress, five major proposals were introduced in the
Senate to regulate internal union affairs. 2 These culminated in the
ill-fated Kennedy-Ives Bill,3 which bounded through the Senate only
to die a fitful death in the House.4 All of these bills went beyond
the control of union finances and reached into the governmental
processes of unions. The Kennedy-Ives Bill sought to regulate
union elections, prescribe certain qualifications for union office, and
limit the power of international unions to impose trusteeships on
local unions.
Proposals for legislation necessarily assume that the public has
an interest in protecting and fostering union democracy. This
premise, although easily assumed, is not so easily demonstrated,
nor can the precise basis of that interest be readily articulated.
The public expects unions to be democratic. When the McClellan
Committee reveals fraudulent elections, persecution of opposition
* Member of the New York Bar. Professor of Law, Yale University. Co-editor
of EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS AND THE LAW (1958) and LABOR RELATIONS AND THE
LAW (1953). B.S., Univ. of Illinois, 1939; J.D., Univ. of Illinois, 1942; J.S.D.,
Columbia Univ., 1952.
1. Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 293, 151 N.E.2d 73, 78 (1958).
2. S. 2925, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), by Senator Ives; S. 3068, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1958), by Senator Knowland; S. 3097, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), by
Senator Smith (so-called Administration Bill); S. 3454, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.(1958), by Senator Kennedy; S. 3618, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), by Senator
McClellan.
3. S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
4. After various amendments on the floor of the Senate, it was passed by a
vote of 88 to 1 on June 17, 1958. Speaker Rayburn held it on his desk in the
House for six weeks before referring it to the House Labor and Education Com-
mittee for a quiet death. Demands for a vote injected new life in the issue, but
on August 18 a motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill without amendment
and with limited debate was defeated by a vote of 198 to 190. New York Times,
Aug. 19, 1958, p. 1, col. 6.
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groups, or feudalistic trusteeships, the public instinctively recoils.
It does not question its interest in curbing others' immorality, but
leaps to the conclusion that there ought to be a law. For most legis-
lators, this ends the inquiry,5 but the demand which the public can
legitimately make of unions depends upon its real interest in union
democracy. The limited purpose here is to try to make more
explicit the various specific sources of the public's real interest.
This may help in weighing the need for legislation and in focusing
that legislation to meet those real interests. 6
The Sources of Public Demand for Union Democracy
At the outset it may be helpful to state more fully why the
public expects unions to be democratic, for these reasons may have
their roots in real interests. First, in a society in which the articu-
late ethic of organization is democratic, we tend to expect all organ-
izations to be democratic. We expect the government of private
groups to mirror the government of public groups. We accept as
faith that democracy is not merely a device for governing the
state but is an ethic which should permeate all of life. This is a
vague, inarticulate conviction based less on logic than on an intui-
tive sense of right; supported less by empirical evidence as to the
relative effectiveness of various political mechanism than on
choice of values. The depth of this conviction is evidenced by the
seeming compulsion of practically all organizations to clothe them-
selves in the trappings of a democratic structure. Constitutions of
organizations as diverse as the American Medical Association pro-
vide for at least the form of democracy. The public expects unions
to be democratic because they are organizations living within a
democratic society.
Second, the public expects unions to be democratic because unions
expect themselves to be democratic. Unions have historically justi-
fied their existence on the grounds that through them workers
5. The Kennedy-Ives Bill S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1958), for example,
asserted that "in order to accomplish the objective of a free flow of commerce it
is essential that labor organizations ... adhere to the highest standards of respon-
sibility and ethical conduct of the internal affairs of their organizations. The
Committee Report on the bill tersely stated:
The internal problems currently facing our labor unions are bound up with
a substantial public interest. Under the National Labor Relations Act and
the Railway Labor Act, a labor organization has vast power over the
economic welfare of the individual member whom it represents. He has a
vital interest, therefore, in the policies and conduct of the union. S. REP.
No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
6. No attempt is made here to separate the appropriate spheres of interest for
the federal government and the states. This important but often ignored problem
has been carefully and thoughtfully analyzed in Wellington, Union Democracy and
Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327
(1958).
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achieve a greater degree of human dignity, and have traditionally
insisted that they are and should be democratic. The Ethical Prac-
tice Code on Democratic Processes states:
Freedom and Democracy are essential attributes of our move-
ment. Labor organizations lacking these attributes are unions
in name only. Authoritarian control is contrary to the spirit,
the tradition and the reasons which should always guide
and govern our movement.
The public has taken seriously these protestations and has accepted
them as sincere statements of the unions' own ethic. It expects
unions to be what they claim to be.
Third, the public fears the size and nature of union power,--
the power to close industries by strikes, the power to marshall
political action, and the power to bind individual workers to collec-
tive contracts against their will. Although this fear is shrewdly
cultivated by those who would weaken unions by creating an exag-
gerated picture of unions as a massive monolith of economic and
political power, the fear is no less real. Out of our history we dis-
trust power which is concentrated in the hands of a few and we
consciously seek to keep that power widely distributed. There is,
therefore, an undercurrent of demand that this power not be held
by a few union officers but that it be shared by the membership
of the union. Only such shared power is considered safe.
The fourth reason the public expects unions to be democratic
is that the union acts as representative of its members. We have
a basic ethical notion that those who claim to represent others
should be controlled by those whom they represent. As an agent
is subject to his principal, the officers of the union should be sub-
ject to their members. Cast in broader terms, this is but an appli-
cation of the fundamental democratic concept that the power to
govern derives its just power from the consent of the governed.
Thus, the union's power to govern must rest on the consent of the
governed as expressed through the democratic process.
These four reasons which the public finds for expecting unions
to be democratic are largely tautological, and are freighted with
emotional and value-laden terms. They fall far short of demon-
strating a public interest in union democracy which would justify
legislation. Many of the same reasons might logically lead to
demands for democracy in corporations, churches or bar associa-
tions, but the public can not be persuaded that lack of democracy
in other organizations justifies lack of democracy in unions. Some-
where in our social subconscious there is a deep current of feeling
that unions occupy some special position and owe some special
responsibility to live up to democratic standards. This intuitive
[Vol. 53
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judgment, no matter how inarticulate or unrationalized, may be
basically valid. Felt needs may be too subtle for explicitness, but
the public may vaguely sense what is genuinely in the public
interest.
The failure to articulate clearly the public's interest may lead
to lashing out against superficial evils or to accepting false reme-
dies which would weaken unions in fulfilling their public purpose.
All that can be said here may be nothing more than retroactive
rationalization based on implicit premises impossible to prove.
The hope, however, is that an attempt to articulate the public
interest may further critical discussion and perhaps push back the
premises another step.
Definition of Union Democracy
Before proceeding further, it is important to define briefly what
is meant by union democracy. This includes at least three basic
elements. First, the members must have a right to participate in
the decisions of the union which affect their welfare. In the words
of Harold Laski, "Democracy means participation. It is above all
the sense of not merely being ruled by law and not by discretion,
but also of making your own experiences articulate in the shaping
of the law by which you are ruled."17 This does not mean, of course,
that participation must be direct as in a New England town meet-
ing, for participation may be through elected representatives.
It does mean that members shall be honestly informed of the
affairs of their union, have full freedom to dissent from official
policies, criticize union officers, and organize a loyal opposition,
and be guaranteed the right to honest elections after open cam-
paigns. Democracy requires, second, a recognition of the right
to equal treatment in enjoying the benefits and the fruits of col-
lective bargaining-the right of racial, political or other minorities
within the organization not to be abused, neglected or discrimi-
nated against by the majority. Democracy requires, third, that pro-
cedures within the union not only conform to the union's estab-
lished rules but fulfil the essential elements of fairness-the right
to due process of law. This obviously does not require the techni-
calities of judicial procedure but includes the right to a full and fair
hearing before a tribunal which has no personal or institutional
interest in the outcome. other than the search for justice. These
three elements do not fully describe a vigorous and affirmative
democratic process, but they are the irreduceable minimum rights
of members if a union is to be termed democratic.
7. LAsi, TRADE UNIONS IN THE NEW SociETY 170 (1949).
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Union Democracy and Collective Bargaining
The public interest in union democracy has its roots in the
functions which the union performs, and the principal function of
the union is to engage in collective bargaining. It is the purpose
of collective bargaining, the character of our collective bargaining
structure, and the union's operation within that structure which
measures the central public interest in union democracy.
The Purpose Of Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining, narrowly conceived, is an economic mech-
anism to equalize bargaining power and thereby enable workers to
get their fair share of the fruits of their labor. This is a significant
function, and to many it is the sole function of collective bargain-
ing. Union officers and union members alike may measure the
worth of the union solely in terms of the economic benefits which
it provides. This narrow purpose may be served by an undemo-
cratic union as well as a democratic one. Somewhat more broadly
conceived, collective bargaining is a device for regulating the labor
market without the evils of either unchecked employer power or
smothering government control. Thus the underlying philosophy
of the Wagner Act was to preserve free enterprise by encouraging
a device which would meet the needs of adequately protecting the
workers' interests with a minimum of government intervention.
This serves the vital political function of creating centers of
power and instruments of control apart from the state so that
the state does not become unmanageable or dangerously large.
It distributes power, thereby strengthening our political pluralism.
This purpose of distributing power can also be served by undemo-
cratic unions, just as federalism can be served, within limits, by
the presence of undemocratic states.
Collective bargaining, however, was historically conceived as
something more than an ingenious gimmick of economic self-
regulation by countervailing power. It was intended to give voice
and meaning to democratic aspirations, to free workers and give
them an opportunity to control their destiny. The Industrial Com-
mission of 1898 stated: "By the organization of labor, and by no
other means, it is possible to introduce an element of democracy
into the government of industry. By this means only can the
workers effectively take part in determining the conditions under
which they work." 8 Again, in 1916 the United States Commission
on Industrial Relations stated: "The struggle of labor for organi-
zation is not merely an attempt to secure an increased measure
8. FINAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COmmISSION OF 1898, at 805 (1902).
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of the material comforts of life, but is an age long struggle for
liberty.... Even if men were well fed, they would still struggle
to be free." 9 This fundamental purpose of unionization and collec-
tive bargaining is reflected in the very structure of the Wagner
Act. Section 7 stated as a basic right the right of workers to
bargain "through representatives of their own choosing." Section
9 established election procedures through which the workers could
choose which, if any, union they preferred to act as their repre-
sentative.
Collective bargaining, as a national policy, is intended to be
an instrument of industrial democracy and that national policy
presupposes that the workers will have a voice through their
union in determining the terms and conditions of their employ-
ment. Collective bargaining is not merely a way of doing business;
it is an integral part of our way of life. It is based essentially
on our sense of the worth of the individual and his right to self-
government--in this case, of his right to industrial self-govern-
ment. This public purpose of collective bargaining is the corner-
stone of the public interest in union democracy.
The Character of Collective Bargaining
The demand for union democracy flows also from the inherently
governmental character of collective bargaining. The collective
contract is a form of legislation providing a far-reaching industrial
code. It governs who shall work by its seniority or closed shop
clause. It prescribes wage rates, holidays and vacations; regulates
promotions and work assignments; controls apprenticeship and
retirement; and through the health and welfare clauses provides
benefits from maternity care to funeral arrangements. The con-
tract by establishing a grievance procedure creates an administra-
tive structure which interprets, applies and enforces this body
of industrial law.
Collective bargaining is not only regulatory in character, it is
compulsory, and this does not depend on the presence of a union
security clause. Under section 9(a) the majority union is the
exclusive representative of all employees in the unit, and the
minority is bound by majority action. The individual loses all
freedom to make his own contract, for the majority union has
exclusive and compulsory power to bargain for all terms and con-
ditions of employment.1 0 This compulsory power extends in prac-
9. Final Report of United States Comm. on Industrial Relations, S. Doc. No.
415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1916).
10. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944)). The same majority rule
principle applies under the Railway Labor Act. Order of Ry. Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944).
19581
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tice to all grievances arising under the contract, for the union
controls the administrative procedures."- The individual must look
to the union for his protection.12 The only point at which the
worker has a choice is at the time of the representation election,
and if there are competing unions this may enable him to exert
pressures on union policies. However, many unions have had no
effective rivals, and the No-Raiding Pact of the AFL-CIO has
further deprived workers of any ability to choose a more respon-
sive union.13 For practical purposes the only alternative is between
the vested union and no union at all. This is no real choice. The
workers can escape an undemocratic union only by abandoning
their rights to industrial self-government. 14
Collective bargaining is also a policy-making process involving
the making of significant choices. The union in bargaining weighs
potential gains against potential sacrifices and chooses whether
to strike or to settle for the employer's last offer. Even though
the net gain is settled, choices still remain. The union chooses
between take-home pay or fringe benefits, between increased vaca-
tions or medical insurance, between fixed wages or an escalator
clause. Many of these choices involve conflicting demands among
the employees. Seniority clauses allocate job rights, taking from
one group and giving to another. Pension plans pit older workers
against younger workers. The choice between cents per hour or
percentage increases involves a conflict between skilled and un-
skilled workers. In many instances the employer is indifferent to
the choice, but the union must distribute the available gains so
as to give the maximum satisfaction to the diverse interests and
demands of the workers involved.
The union is the worker's sole spokesman in this process of indus-
trial government which so completely regulates his working life.
The union makes critical choices which bind him and control his
11. Under section 9(a) the individual employee may present his own grievance
and have it adjusted, but the precise rights which this creates are difficult to
determine. See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REv. 601
(1956); Report of Committee on Improvement of Administration of Union-
Management Agreements, 1954, Individual Grievances, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143 (1955).
12. As individuals or small groups the employees cannot begin to possess the
bargaining power of their respesentatives in negotiating with their employer
or in presenting their grievances to him. Nor may a minority choose another
agent to bargain in their behalf. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
13. In United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1958),
the court, using § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act specifically enforced an arbitration
award under the pact ordering the challenging union to withdraw the representa-
tion petition it had filed with the NLRB.
14. Some have argued that democracy within the union is not necessary because
the union must of necessity serve the members' interests. See ALLEN, POWER IN
TRADE UNIONS 10-14 (1954). This, however, is based upon the implicit premise
that if the members are dissatisfied, they can leave the union and choose another
as their representative. Such an alternative may have practical reality in England,
but it has little reality in this country.
[Vol. 53
HeinOnline  -- 53 Nw. U. L. Rev.  616 1958-1959
THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN UNION DEMOCRACY
very livelihood, and his only voice of preference or protest is within
the union. The public purpose in collective bargaining, if it is to
be fully realized, requires that these union decisions be made
democratically.
The Preservation of Collective Bargaining
The public interest in fostering union democracy is interlocked
with the public interest in protecting collective bargaining itself,
for there is serious doubt whether collective bargaining can long
survive the attacks of its enemies and detractors if unions are not
democratic.
Collective bargaining is not invulnerable and its future may be
more precarious than is openly admitted. Collective bargaining is
not genuinely accepted by all or perhaps even by a majority of
employers. Relatively few employers have an affirmative desire to
preserve the union's power, especially if the union speaks force-
fully for the workers' interests and their right to participate in a
meaningful industrial government. Many employers are actively
hostile. Recent testimony before the McClellan Committee has
revealed that use of labor spy, organization of company-inspired
union and other flagrant methods of frustrating or destroying real
collective bargaining are still practiced. Casual reading of the
NLRB reports makes clear that more refined but no less destructive
practices are wide-spread. Employers are not alone in this latent
hostility to unions, for there is among farm, self-employed, profes-
sional and white collar groups a vast reservoir of anti-union senti-
ment. We have, at best, a partial acceptance of unions and a half-
hearted commitment to collective bargaining.
This vulnerability is increased by the overly apparent fact that
collective bargaining is an imperfect economic mechanism. It pur-
ports to regulate terms and conditions of employment by bargain-
ing between competing economic interest groups. However, rela-
tively equal bargaining power between the employer and the union
is often lacking. The corner laundry is helpless before the
Teamsters, and "bargaining" consists of abiding by the business
agent's decrees. Similarly, the Retail Clerks are frequently helpless
before a large department store, and must be satisfied with such
crumbs as the employer may drop. Bargaining may fail, not only
because there is no relative equality but because there is no real
competition. The union and employer may at times act not in oppo-
sition but in collusion to the detriment either of the workers or the
consumers. These imperfections, although magnified in the public
mind, weaken our public commitment to collective bargaining. Par-
1958]
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ticularly if we narrowly conceive of collective bargaining as merely
an economic device of countervailing power, we may ultimately be
persuaded to abandon it as too clumsy and costly to be worth
preserving.
History makes reasonably clear that the public has always dis-
trusted concentrations of private power in the economic sphere. It
will attempt, even though with some futility, if not destructiveness,
to eliminate these concentrations. Thus, the Sherman Act attempted
to break up monopolies and combinations which unreasonably
restrained trade. It is perhaps symptomatic that one of the demands
now made is that unions be subject to those same anti-trust laws.
Thus, the National Association of Manufacturers, in terming the
Kennedy-Ives bill a "sham and delusion" declared that "real reform
requires prohibition of monopolistic practices by unions, an end to
compulsory union membership... ."-15 Even though concentrations
of economic power are not broken up, they do not escape. Public
utilities have been subject to direct and extensive governmental
control, and less substantial but intensive controls over large cor-
porations have been effected through the Securities Exchange
Commission. A straw in the wind is the growing tendency to term
unions public utilities.' 6 It is this form of government regulation
which it is of the utmost public interest to avoid, for it would
destroy free collective bargaining. The underlying fears can be
quieted in some measure by an assurance of democratic unionism
which curbs concentrated power in the hands of a few officers
by distributing control widely among the members.
The long term survival of a vital and effective system of collec-
tive bargaining depends on a deeply rooted conviction on the part
of the public that collective bargaining serves a function beyond
providing a balance of economic power. Only as the public is con-
vinced that collective bargaining enriches our democratic way by
providing a process of industrial self-government will it be willing
to accept the imperfections of that process and encourage its
growth. That conviction must properly rest on the premise of
democratic unionism. The public interest in preserving collective
bargaining creates a correlative public interest in union democracy.
The Practical Needs of Collective Bargaining
This reasoning necessarily assumes that a democratic union can
15. Letter from Edward Maher, Vice President, National Association of Manu-
facturers, to the Editor of the New York Times, Aug. 27, 1958. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 30, 1958, p. 14, col. 6.
16. See, e.g., Tobriner, The Labor Union: Public Utility of Labor Relations,
43 A.B.A.J. 805 (1957).
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meet the practical needs of collective bargaining. This assumption
has been subject to attack on several grounds.
First, it is argued that democracy within the union creates
disunity and causes inefficiency, thereby weakening the union's
ability to gain benefits for its members. John L. Lewis justified
his autocratic powers in direct terms: "It is a question whether you
desire your organization to be the most effective instrumentality
... or whether you prefer to sacrifice the efficiency of your organi-
zation for a little more academic freedom... . '17 The union is often
described metaphorically as an army fighting the employer for
survival. The strike is a battle on behalf of the members, and the
union's duty is to win that battle.' 8 The union, it is suggested, can
not be democratic any more than an army can be democratic.
There are certainly instances of unions being weakened by inter-
nal conflicts over policy and struggles for power, but such inter-
necine fights are not limited to democratic unions. One of the
major functions of democracy is to provide orderly processes for
resolving such internal conflicts before tensions have generated
explosive force. The right to dissent helps achieve consensus which
is the solid base of strength. Empirically, democratic unions have
demonstrated the strength to withstand the most bitter strikes and
win benefits for their members. There is no persuasive evidence
that undemocratic unions have done better. As the New York
Court of Appeals said in Madden v. Atkins: 9 "In the final analysis,
a labor union profits, as does any democratic body, more by per-
mitting free expression and free political opposition than it may
ever lose from any disunity it may thus evidence."
Second, it is argued that union democracy is inconsistent with
union responsibility. Professor Dunlop has said, "it is sheer dema-
goguery to hold that we can have unions which at the same time
are highly responsive to the rank and file and at the same time
highly responsible and businesslike." 20 Certainly, attempting to
placate all immediate surface desires of the members can lead to
fruitless strikes, destruction of the employer, and ultimate frus-
tration of every real desire of the members. Democracy, however,
is not a process for placating desires but for reconciling conflicting
demands. Freedom of expression within the union helps to reveal
17. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 34TH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE UMW 122
(1936). In the words of Professor Taft, "mutually warring factions are a luxury
most unions can not afford." TAFT, THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR
UNioxs 239 (1954).
18. The classic statement of this problem is in Muste, Army and Town Meeting,
in BAKiCE AND KERR, UNIONS, MANAGEMENT, AND PUBLIC 187 (1948).
19. 4 N.Y.2d 283, 293, 151 N.E.2d 73, 78 (1958).
20. Dunlop, The Public Interest in Internal Union Affairs, in SECrION OF LABoR
RELATIONS LAW OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE 1957 PROCEED-
INGS, 13.
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the width and depth of competing desires, open discussion helps
to clarify the inherent impossibility of satisfying all desires and
the inevitability of hard choices, and full participation in the
decision-making process makes the hard choice more acceptable.
Professor George W. Taylor has pointed out that "failure
adequately to reconcile the internal differences between the con-
flicting interests of members can lead to such excessive or
unachievable demands as to cause either a breakdown of collective
bargaining or pressure from so-called splinter groups to establish
separate units of representation." 21 Responsible collective bargain-
ing requires this reconciliation process, and this is the very heart
of the democratic process.
It is true that a deeply entrenched leader in an undemocratic
union may be more "responsible" from the employers' viewpoint-
if this is a virtue. If he is both selfless and sensitive to the mem-
bers' desires, he may wisely adjust the competing demands within
the union. However, most autocratic union leaders live and bargain
in constant fear of rebellion from within. Unreal demands may
be made at the bargaining table to quiet the unrest. The needs of
the employer, and the real desires of the members are ignored,
and preservation of autocratic power becomes the sole considera-
tion. Without the democratic checks of free criticism, open debate,
and orderly processes for change of officers and policies, there is
no assurance that leaders will be either responsive or responsible.
Democracy in unions, as in government, may at times be irre-
sponsible or shortsighted; it may at times choose leaders who are
opportunistic or calloused. The immediate question, however, is
whether democracy within the union prevents it from meeting
the practical needs of collective bargaining. Although some demo-
cratic unions have failed to meet the full measure of need, an
objective study of labor history makes reasonably clear that
most democratic unions have been effective and responsible in-
struments for achieving the purposes of collective bargaining.
On the other hand, recent disclosures have made clear that it
has been certain undemocratic unions which have most seriously
corrupted and blighted our bargaining system, and that the very
lack of democracy within these unions contributed to their corrupt
and predatory tendencies. The evidence suggests that in the long
run democracy is not a hindrance but a help.22
21. Taylor, The Role of Unions in a Democratic Society, Address before the
Harry Shulman Conference on Labor Law, New Haven, Conn., (1958).
22. It is possible, of course, to make selective comparisons which will make it
appear that the performance of a particular democratic union is less responsible
than a particular undemocratic union. See Jacobs, Union Democracy and the Public
Good, 25 Commentary 68 (1958). However, comparing the International Typo-
graphical Union with the International Ladies Garment Workers is apt to be less
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Union Democracy and Other Union Functions
Unions have a wide range of functions other than collective
bargaining. These too, recommend union democracy, and this
recommendation gains added weight because the union at the
same time acts as the workers representative. A brief glance at
two of these functions may suffice to suggest some of the consid-
erations involved.
First, unions engage in extensive political activity. This may
consist of direct political action ranging from merely endorsing
candidates to providing campaign funds and full-time campaign
workers. It also includes political education programs which,
though not directed toward the election of any particular candi-
date, may influence political decisions on subjects reaching from
social security or public housing to segregation or foreign aid.
This contributes a much needed vitality to our political discussions,
but it also poses serious problems for a democratic society.
The use of pooled resources by large interest groups for the
purpose of influencing elections and political decisions has long
been recognized as a substantial danger within our political sys-
tem. Samuel Gompers, in urging passage of the Corrupt Practices
Act, said, "if we are really determined that our elections shall
be free from the power of money and its lavish use and expendi-
ture without an accounting to the conscience and judgment of the
people of America, we will have to pass some measure of the
kind.' ' 23 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in tracing the fifty-year history
of this legislation, aptly summarized it as "congressional efforts
calculated to avoid the deleterious influences on federal elections
resulting from the use of money by those who exercise control
over large aggregations of capital." 24 The central danger of such
aggregations in politics is that the ability of individuals or small
groups to influence decisions is relatively diminished, and the
political arena becomes occupied by a few large groups with
extensive funds, and elaborate structures for promoting their
candidates and policies. These blocks of political power destroy
fluidity, and small groups are crowded out, and individuals are
rendered impotent. The individual has a growing sense of futility
in political activity and becomes apathetic and resigned. To this
is added the danger that a few individuals will gain effective con-
trol and then manipulate these blocks without adequate responsi-
bility to those for whom they speak.
revealing than comparing it with the other major union in the printing industry,
the Printing Pressmen, or other craft unions such as the Painters, or the Musicians.
23. Hearings Before the House Committee on Elections, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.
31 (1906).
24. United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957).
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Legislation can not effectively reach this problem without de-
stroying basic political freedoms. However, most of the dangers
arising from such blocks operating in our system are substantially
reduced if those blocks are subject to internal democratic controls
which give some assurance that when the group promotes a par-
ticular view, it in fact represents the interests of the group and
that the group's activities are based on the consent of those whom
it purports to represent. Union democracy gives the member some
opportunity to participate in the political process, at least in-
directly. It reduces centralization of political influence in the hands
of a few officers and gives some assurance that union's political
activity represents the consensus of the members.
This need for unions to make their political decisions demo-
cratically is all the greater because the union combines its political
function with its collective bargaining function. The union requires
workers, as a price of participating in their industrial government,
to pay dues, and then uses a portion of that dues dollar to promote
particular political causes.2 5 At the very least, the individual who
is thus compelled to contribute should be entitled to a voice in
determining the political and educational policies of his union.
A second subsidiary function of unions is the management of
financial resources. Union treasuries have now become significant
investments. The use of these funds which belong to the members
requires real policy decisions. The union must choose whether it
should invest in government bonds, build a housing project, make
loans to other unions or to businesses employing union members, or
contribute to various charities and social welfare activities. The
union acquires these funds because it acts as a collective bargaining
representative, and workers are compelled to contribute in order
to participate in the collective bargaining function. There is, there-
fore, a strong interest that the members have a voice in choosing
what shall be done with their money. The conflicting values and
wide variation of choice suggest that the determination should be
subject to the democratic process.
Democratic Unions and the Democratic Society
The public interest in union democracy has its deepest roots in
the need to maintain and foster favorable conditions for political
democracy. A democratic government can not thrive on sterile
soil and in a hostile climate, but can grow only in a society which
25. Under § 304 of Taft-Hartley, the union can not make contributions to
candidates running for federal office, but still in most states it can make
contributions to candidates running for state and local office. In addition it can
engage in a wide but undefined range of political education and advocacy on national
and local issues.
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nourishes in all its activities the democratic method. If people
come to expect those organizations such as unions with which they
have daily contact not to be democratic, they may well cease to
expect their government to be democratic. A pluralist society such
as ours gives special significance to certain private groups and
structures which serve as centers of distributed power for regula-
tory purposes. Unions now form one of the most important power
centers because of their role in industrial government. If people
come to believe that in their industrial government, policy decisions
should be left to experts and dedicated autocrats, they will ulti-
mately look to experts to make decisions for them in their political
government. Benevolent despotism in private groups tends to starve
and wither democracy in government.
Furthermore, private organizations are the training grounds for
public leaders, and it is in these organizations that their attitudes
of leadership are formed. If these organizations are not democratic,
the leaders coming from them will carry into government undemo-
cratic attitudes. Unions increasingly provide a stepping stone to
political leadership. It is in the public interest that these men who
shall become political leaders of tomorrow shall today learn to work
under the stresses and strains of the democratic process within
their union. In a healthy democracy people expect that significant
decisions will be made democratically, and leaders whom the people
elect expect to abide by the democratic process. The public interest
in union democracy is in preserving and encouraging these basic
expectations of a democratic society.
Democratic unions can make another vital contribution to our
political democracy by educating and training the electorate.2 6 Our
complex industrial society requires the making of political decisions
which involve complicated economic problems and combinations of
interrelated values. Democracy depends on the voter's ability to
understand the central issues and to choose intelligently. If unions
are democratic, this provides a valuable avenue of education for a
broad segment of the public. If union leaders must educate their
members to understand the practical needs of industry so that they
will make wise choices in collective bargaining, then these members
will in their political life become more responsible citizens. On the
other hand, autocratic union leaders not only lack compulsion to
educate their members, but may deliberately conceal or mislead in
order to justify their policies. Such deception, made possible by
26. As Harold Laski has said:
A union which lends itself . . . to the domination of one man or even a
small group of men is failing to achieve one of the single most important
functions of trade unionism-the training of the rank and file in the art
of self-government. Laski, supra note 7, at 163.
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the lack of open discussion and free opposition, makes the members
less responsible citizens.
These interests in preserving a healthy climate for political
democracy, in developing a democratically trained political leader-
ship, and in educating a responsible citizenry have some application
to organizations other than unions. However, it is relatively obvious
that unions have no real analogue in any other private group. Their
economic power is not only broad but deeply channelled. Their
power to legislate concerning industrial affairs, reinforced by legal
protection and government authorization, is compulsory in charac-
ter, binding workers together whether they choose to be bound or
not. No other private organization has such all-encompassing, gov-
ernment supported, compulsory power over the vital elements of
so many people's existence.
The nearest analogue to the union is the corporation, but the
interest of the member in the union is far different from the inter-
est of the stockholder in the corporation. The union regulates the
individual's working life while the corporation regulates only the
income from the investor's capital. To the worker the union reaches
the whole of his means of existence, while the investor may have
only a small portion of his funds in the particular corporation. The
stockholder is not compelled to continue ownership in the corpora-
tion but normally can sell his stock and buy shares in another
corporation whose policies suit him better. The worker's only alter-
native is to quit his job and hope to find work under the jurisdic-
tion of a more satisfactory union. Corporations have no power
to expel stockholders who criticize or deny dividends to those who
disagree. The more appropriate parallel is between the power of
the corporation over its employees and the power of the union over
its members. This, however, emphasizes the need for union
democracy. The goal is to give the worker some voice in determin-
ing the terms and conditions of his employment, some form of
industrial self-government. The very lack of any such channel on
the corporate side requires it on the union side. Union democracy
is, in this sense, the antidote for corporate autocracy.
Conclusion
The union movement has become one of the most significant
institutions in our society. It was the product of democratic fervor,
born and nurtured for the purpose of bringing into industry a
greater measure of personal freedom and personal dignity. Its
instrument of industrial democracy was collective bargaining
through which workers gained a voice in determining the rules
which governed their working lives.
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Unions through collective bargaining exercise an unsurpassed
power over the lives of their members. This power is regulatory
and compulsory, reinforced by legal protection, recognition and
authorization. This power is granted because of the public interest
in collective bargaining, but collective bargaining can not survive
in full vigor unless it fulfils its purpose of contributing to our
democratic way. This purpose can be fulfilled only by democratic
unions.
This does not necessarily justify sweeping legislation on internal
union affairs, for the underlying premises of pluralism on which
collective bargaining itself rests urges against extensive govern-
ment control. It is better that some evils continue with the hope
of self-correction than to seek to drive them out by legislation.
However, the very interest in curtailing the reach of the state
makes union democracy all the more imperative, for the demo-
cratic process is the best instrument of self-correction.
This is no blueprint for action-not even a starting sketch.
The purpose has been only to seek the sources of public interest
in union democracy in the hopes of pushing back the premises
another step. If there is a deeper premise it is that a vigorous
pluralism of democratically controlled centers of power is neces-
sary to the preservation of our political democracy and the main-
tenance of personal freedom.
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